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Abstract The promise of agent-based for explicating properties of social systems
has not yet been fully realized. Agent models sometimes provide only a veneer of,
rather than substantive engagement with, social behavior. The problem will be illus-
trated with Axelrod’s model for evolution of ethnocentrism (a biological model) ver-
sus Schelling’s model for spatial segregation based on preferences (a cultural model).
The examples show the need to incorporate both the biological and cultural basis
for behavior through a schema that includes behavior based on cultural/cognitive
processing of information and behavior based on biological/cognitive processing of
information. An example of an agent-based model that implements decision making
in this manner is discussed. The model accounts for heterogeneity in behavior out-
comes and leads to two main predictions: (1) small scale, hunter-gatherer societies
in resource scarce environments will have stable adaptations less affected by varia-
tion in resource abundance in comparison to groups in resource rich regions where
inter-group conflict is more likely and (2) the relationship between community size,
population size and administrative complexity will have two distinct patterns, one for
patrilineally organized societies and the other for matrilineally organized societies.
Both predictions have been verified empirically.
Keywords Agent-based modeling · Social simulation · Culturally based decision
making · Birth spacing model · Paramount states · Administrative hierarchy
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The utility of agent-based modeling for the social sciences seems almost self-evident.
Social systems, by their very definition, involve interacting agents with a multitude of
interests, goals, and intentionalities. As participants in a social system we do not see
ourselves and those with whom we interact as acting in easily predicted manners and
we depend upon a variety of social institutions and role-systems to make the com-
plexity of social interaction more manageable. In comparison to the agents in most
other mammalian social systems, we are highly individualistic in the sense we are
capable of a wide range of behaviors according to the context in which we interact.
For analytical purposes, we divide this range of behaviors into categories such as re-
ligious, economic, political, and kinship behavior and academically we specialize in
the analysis of, and develop theories for, particular kinds of behavior. As anthropolo-
gists are quick to point out, these divisions may be analytically useful but sometimes
imply a separation in kinds of behaviors that do not reflect the reality on the ground.
Because agent-based modeling lends itself to a more holistic approach to simulation
of social systems without imposing boundaries, many have noted the integrative as-
pect of agent-based modeling as one of its strengths: “By focusing attention on the
actors in social and environmental settings, agent-based models may have an impor-
tant role to play in integrating theories from psychology, economics, sociology, ge-
ography and elsewhere. . . . provoking theory development and also enabling testing
of theories.” (O’Sullivan 2008, p. 546).
Beyond an integrative aspect, agent-based modeling makes it possible to engage
in experimental methods that are the hallmark of the physical sciences. We are “pro-
vided for the first time the possibility of using experimental methods with social phe-
nomena” (Gilbert 2007, p. 115), a theme taken up by several of the papers in the work-
shop: “multi-agent simulation offers an attractive alternative to field or laboratory-
based studies of group decision making mechanisms” (Zappala and Logan 2009, p. 2)
and “AmISim [Ambient Intelligence Simulation] provides a simulation framework
which can test scenarios that would be impossible in real environments.” (Garcia-
Valverde et al. 2009, p. 11).
Despite the very real advantages offered by social simulations, the social sciences
have been slow to adopt multi-agent modeling as part of the methods of the social
sciences. As one commentator has noted recently,
“Complex adaptive systems models have the potential to transform social sci-
ence. With them scholars can construct and analyze models that include real
world features such as networks, adaptation, heterogeneity, and interactions.
. . .The notion that social simulation models can improve social science should
be non controversial, thus, my puzzlement over the current state of affairs.
While social simulation has made inroads . . . it has yet to become a core
methodology of social science” (Page 2008, emphasis added).
This theme was taken up by several of the workshop papers. One paper suggested
that there has been an overemphasis on agent-based modeling of the supposed ratio-
nality of humans and not on humans per se: “much of the potential [of agent-based
modeling] is underdeveloped because agent based approaches historically have been
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centered on rationality but not humans.” (Zhang and Leezer 2009, p. 1). The distinc-
tion was made very graphically in another paper through noting that humans resort
to “bullshit” and not rationality as a way to manipulate social interactions: “different
situations. . . in human society, provide strong individual incentives for bullshit. Over-
all, our analysis is meant to identify some particularly troublesome issues regarding
reasoning in social context.” (Caminada 2009, p. 1).
These comments indicate that despite the optimism for social simulations, the hu-
man side of what is involved in social interactions is underdeveloped. Even for areas
as well studied as the concept of norms in human behavior, attempts to simulate nor-
mative behavior are still in their early stages:
“This paper investigates to what extent normative agent-based models are able
to capture the role theoretic concept of norms. Three methodological core prob-
lems are identified: the question of norm transmission, normative transforma-
tion of agents and what kind of analysis the models contribute. . . . However, the
degree of resolution of intra agent processes remains too low for a comprehen-
sive understanding of normative behaviour regulation. . . [and] an investigation
of the recursive impact of inter- and intra-agent processes is still in its fledgling
stages.” (Neumann 2008, emphasis added).
New approaches may resolve some of these issues. One of the workshop papers
addressed ways to model changes in norms in a linguistic context: “We have pre-
sented an approach to study consensus [norms] under constraints, and have shown
that we can model phenomena of sound change such as vowel shifts. However, the
same approach can, in principle, also be applied to any situation where we have a
system of constrained variables over which consensus must be achieved.” (Lakkaraju
et al. 2009, p. 4). But more than just new simulation approaches are needed. We need
to examine the models we use when simulating human behavior and to see if they are
adequate, especially with regard to the cultural side of human behavior.
2 Biological versus cultural modeling of social behavior
2.1 Biological model for the evolution of ethnocentrism
We can illustrate the question being raised here with a model developed by Robert
Axelrod and Ross Hammond (Axelrod and Hammond 2003) for the evolution of eth-
nocentrism. The model is very simple, yet appears to have far-reaching implications
about the evolution of ethnocentric behavior. At first glance, it appears to address the
human side of social behavior by using terms such as ethnocentrism.
In the model, agents have a trait value for group membership (one of four colors)
and a trait value (cooperate or defect) for each of two interaction strategies: (1) ac-
tion taken with same-group members and (2) action taken with other-group members.
All three trait values are inherited by an offspring. Agents with an ethnocentric in-
teraction strategy are defined as those who cooperate with same-group and defect
with other-group agents. The simulation begins with a cohort of agents, with a uni-
form distribution of trait values, migrating randomly to a region. Agents reproduce
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according to initial fitness values modified in accordance with the outcome of Pris-
oner’s Dilemma games played between agents and spatially adjacent agents. Agents
die according to a fixed mortality rate.1
The goal of the simulation is to explore conditions leading to evolution of the eth-
nocentric interaction strategy. They find that “the simulation results show that the eth-
nocentric strategy becomes common even though there is no explicit bias for it in the
model . . .76% of the agents have the ethnocentric strategy” (Axelrod and Hammond
2003, p. 11), which leads them to conclude “that in-group favoritism can overcome
egoism and dominate a population even in the absence of reciprocity and reputation,
and even when ‘cheats’ (mimics) need to be suppressed” (Axelrod and Hammond
2003, p. 12). On the face of it, the simulation appears to show that a simple model
accounts for the evolution of ethnocentrism, a very human behavior.
2.1.1 Conceptual problems with the simulation
The results are less impressive, though, when we realize that the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game is actually implemented as two independent games (with the same payoffs)
for each of the two strategies (see source code [Wilensky 2006] for the simulation).
Game 1 is played when interacting with a same color agent and Game 2 is played
when interacting with a different color agent. Since these are independent events,
Prob(ethnocentric strategy) = Prob(cooperate with same color agent) × Prob(defect
with other color agent). For example, using the spatial condition that an offspring re-
sides adjacent to a parent, Prob(cooperate with same color agent) = 0.9, Prob(defect
with other color agent) = 0.84 and Prob(ethnocentric behavior) = 0.9 × 0.84 = 0.76
(all three probabilities from Axelrod and Hammond 2003, p. 11). In other words, it is
not the frequency of the ethnocentric strategy that is evolving but the frequencies for
each of the two strategies, “action taken with same-group agents” and “action taken
with other-group agents.”
The evolution of these two strategies is driven by the spatial structure induced
under the assumption that an offspring is adjacent to its parent. This assumption leads
to agents of the same color being distributed in spatial clusters and all agents in a
cluster having the same behavior due to trait inheritance. When an agent interacts
with an adjacent agent of the same color, both are from the same cluster and so
both have the same behavior when playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game: either both
cooperate or both defect. Under these conditions, the game payoffs favor the agents
with the altruistic behavior, “always cooperate” when interacting with an agent from
the same group: “The success of altruism is due to local reproduction and interaction
where altruists are likely to meet others with the same genes” (Németh and Takács
2007).
When interacting agents have different colors they are from different clusters. The
distribution of clusters by color is spatially random since the agents whose initial
location under migration is random determine the clusters. Hence for this Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, agents are essentially interacting randomly with respect to color and
1The simulation is included in the library of social science models distributed with NetLogo (Wilensky
1999).
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Fig. 1 Schema for behavior based on cognitive/biological processing of sensory information. Shadowed
text refers to simulation properties. See text for details
behavior. As is well known, under these conditions the defect strategy will win out
under Prisoner’s Dilemma payoffs.
If, instead of being adjacent to parent, the offspring are located randomly with
respect to parent in the simulation, what is being called ethnocentric behavior should
not evolve since all agents would now be interacting randomly with respect to color
and behavior. Not surprisingly, under these conditions there is “only 5% cooperation
in the populations as a whole” (Axelrod and Hammond 2003, p. 14).
Although the simulation is couched using terms such as ethnocentrism, the under-
lying structure of the simulation does not relate to ethnocentrism as a trait but simply
as a label for the intersection of “cooperate with same color agent” and “defect with
other-color agent.” The frequencies for these two strategies are driven by the two
independent Prisoner’s Dilemma games with outcomes structured by a demographi-
cally induced spatial distribution for the agents.
2.1.2 Simulation uses a biological schema for behavior
Now step back from the details of the simulation and consider the implicit model
for human behavior underlying the simulation. As shown in Fig. 1, it is a biological
schema for behavior without a cultural component, hardly a satisfactory model for
ethnocentric behavior. Beginning on the left side of Fig. 1, the schema begins with
external signals processed by the sensory apparatus and then subjected to cognitive
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processing, with output a mental representation. In the simulation, an (implicit) men-
tal representation for an agent is the color and spatial location of another agent. In the
schema, goals and strategies are used to identify the relevant mental representations
when formulating a behavior aimed at satisfying a goal (in the simulation, agents
have a reproductive goal mediated through interaction with an adjacent agent using a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game and so agents pay attention to the color and spatial location
of other agents). The schema shows a connection from cognitive processing to goals
and strategies; goals and strategies are not fixed but may change according to sensory
information received and cognitively processed by the agent. The goals and strategies
and the mental representations are then evaluated and lead to a decision as to what
behavior to employ (e.g., play a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with an adjacent agent).
Agent behaviors have consequences for fitness values (via modification of the fitness
value by the payoffs from the Prisoner’s Dilemma game) and the fitness values feed
back in a standard way to the frequencies in the gene pool for the agents. The gene
pool has a species boundary (implicit in the simulation). In sum, the simulation is
essentially a standard biological model for a phenotypic trait with biologically based
behaviors included as part of the phenotype. Culture plays no role in the schema and
so ethnocentric behavior is assumed to be culture free, a questionable assumption.
2.2 Cultural model for the evolution of spatial segregation
Now compare this simulation to the now-classic Schelling simulation model for the
emergence of spatial segregation due to agent decision-making based on the likeli-
hood of moving to a new location as a function of an agent’s degree of happiness
with her/his current neighborhood. Happiness is based on the degree of similarity
(however similarity might be conceptualized) with one’s neighbors. The simulated
decision-making behavior is based on assumptions about social behavior that has
theoretical and empirical support, as noted by one of the workshop papers: “social
comparison is a general cognitive process underlying social behavior” (Fridman et al.
2009, p. 1). In addition, similarity is measured using information available to a person
in the real world and the simulation uses a plausible decision model based on taking
action when a trait value exceeds an individual-specific threshold value.
The simulation has been widely cited and used for teaching purposes due to the
seeming plausibility of the assumptions of the simulation, hence the outcomes of
the simulation relate to real-world phenomena. The simulation shows that segrega-
tion can be self-organizing and emergent even absent any imposed constraints on
the spatial location of agents. Even with decisions that would be seen by most to
be unbiased—stay in a neighborhood when even 60% of one’s neighbors are unlike
oneself—segregation emerges. The outcomes of the simulation challenge conven-
tional wisdom that has attributed urban segregation to imposed restrictions:
“The implication of much commentary on urban areas is that the urban fab-
ric would quickly become integrated if discrimination and other constraints
on residential opportunities were eliminated (Zubrinsky and Bobo 1996). The
preference and social distance work both in its mathematical and agent-based
forms, and the survey results raise serious questions about this view (Fossett
2006). They suggest that mere tolerance and the absence of virulent housing
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Fig. 2 Schema for behaviors based on either cognitive/biological or cultural processing of sensory infor-
mation. Shadowed text refers to simulation properties. See text for details
discrimination will not produce integration under prevailing patterns of ethnic
preference, at least, not in the short run.” (Clark and Fossett 2008, p. 4114,
emphasis added).
Contrary to the simulation by Axelrod and Hammond (2003), Clark and Fossett
argue, and the Schelling simulation demonstrates, that preexisting ethnic preference
is a driving force for the segregated spatial structure found in urban context and not
the reverse.
2.2.1 Cultural schema for behavior
We can characterize the Schelling simulation with a behavior schema that includes a
cultural component (see Fig. 2). In this schema, a cultural processing component, act-
ing in parallel with the cognitive/biological processing component, assigns cultural
meaning to external phenomena. By cultural meaning is meant the common mean-
ing shared among those enculturated in the same cultural system. This contrasts with
the individual meaning of external phenomena provided through cognitive/biological
processing of sensory data and where shared meaning occurs only in a statistical
sense.
We can illustrate the difference in the two kinds of meaning with a simple ex-
ample of public spaces with lawns and walkways for pedestrians. Often lawns have
a dirt path created by agents following the shortest path between two points rather
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than the walkway culturally marked as the appropriate walking route. That is, we
sometimes act according to a cognitive/biological processing system biased towards
following the shortest path or sometimes according to a cultural processing system
biased towards following the path designated as the appropriate path even when it
is longer. The biological processing system reflects pan-species evolutionary selec-
tion for visual processing systems biased towards following a straight-line path when
physically feasible. When we use the walkways, we are using our cultural process-
ing system that recognizes the walkway as having the cultural meaning “this is the
proper place to walk,” hence we are acting in accordance with the shared, cultural
meaning of a walkway. The latter contrasts with individual calculation of the short-
est path using cognitive/biological processing. Different individuals may make the
same calculation due to their shared biological heritage, which leads to many indi-
viduals coincidentally following the same shortest-distance path, thereby leading to
the formation of a dirt path across the lawn.
When we observe individuals arriving at a point where a choice can be made
between a shortest distance path and a longer walkway, some individuals decide one
way and others decide the other way. If we watch the same individual over several
days, that person may take one route on some occasions and the other route on other
occasions—perhaps for reasons such as “I’m late, so I’ll walk across the lawn,” or
perhaps for no particular reason.
This simple example underscores the fact that, as culture-bearers, we have two,
distinct systems for the processing of the sensory information we receive from the
external world as indicated in Fig. 2. This also implies that we are part of two systems
with different boundaries: a biological system with a species boundary and a cultural
system with a social boundary determined by those who are enculturated into the
same cultural system.
Mental representations must now be divided into biological versus cultural repre-
sentations (as indicated by the subscripting in the schema). Sometimes the two may
be the same, but other times they are widely divergent, as with the culture-specific
concept of humanness that has no biological counterpart. These two systems can
each lead to a possible behavior, hence we must also have a decision system that ad-
judicates between the behaviors—this can be seen in our decision on one day to walk
across the lawn and on another day to follow the walkway.
2.2.2 Schelling simulation and the cultural schema for behavior
The Schelling simulation fits with this schema through the neighbors (external phe-
nomena) being evaluated as similar or dissimilar, which may be based on culturally
identified attributes for making such a comparison. We engage in public discussions
regarding what are proper or improper attributes for making such an evaluation and
what weighting should be placed on them. The Schelling model captures the current
outcome of such a discussion through the parameter value for the degree of similarity
agents needed for staying put. Though the decision-making involves an emotion (hap-
piness due to similarity of neighbors) related to cognitive/biological processing, the
attributes affecting the emotional state for an agent may depend on cultural criteria.
The cognitive/biological processing might lead to behaviorB = “stay put” (since this
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behavior has less cost than moving to another location and no fitness benefit accrues
in the simulation from randomly moving to another location), while at the same time
the cultural processing may lead to the behaviorC = “move to new location” (since
not all of one’s neighbors are similar to oneself) and a decision is made between these
two behaviors through an adjudication process.2 In the simulation, the adjudication
is done by comparing the degree of unhappiness due to dissimilar neighbors with a
threshold value: chose behaviorB if unhappiness < threshold value, otherwise choose
behaviorC.
3 Implications and predictions of a cultural based simulation for three spatial
patterns and forms of social organization
Now we want to use the cultural schema to simulate the implications of culture-based
behaviors. The context for the simulation is the !Kung san, a hunter-gatherer group
that inhabits the northwestern part of Botswana in Africa. In the simulation, agents act
in accordance with the culturally framed comments !Kung san women make about
children and healthy families. The goal is to explore the consequences their com-
ments for behavior relating to birth spacing and through that for emergent group
properties such as a stabilized population size (Read 2003). We will then apply the
model to three different spatial configurations for social units and access to resources
that characterize hunter-gatherer, patrilineal and matrilineal societies, respectively. In
each case, we will make non-trivial predictions from the model that are then verified
by ethnographic data.
3.1 Decision model for birth spacing
Like other hunter-gather groups, the !Kung san are divided into social units, which
we can refer to as residence groups, that are the locus for day-to-day activities. A res-
idence group is made up of around 5–6 families, or about 25–30 persons. Spatially
associated with a residence group is a region they refer to as a n!ore. All members of
the residence group have the right to hunt and forage for resources in the n!ore and
have access to the resources in the n!ore of another residence group through culturally
constituted kin relations expressed through a kinship terminology. This implies that,
for simulation purposes, we can consider the population as a whole without dividing
it into residence groups.
For the population as a whole, we need to distinguish between absolute carrying
capacity, K , defined as the maximum number of individuals that can be sustained
keeping fixed the mode of resource procurement, and the observed carrying capacity,
K∗, the equilibrium density (if any) that ensues from the group’s mode of resource
procurement and decisions made about birth spacing. With fixed area from which
resources are obtained, we may measure K∗ and K as population sizes. The goal
of the simulation is to relate K∗ to behaviors derived from what woman say about
having families and children.
2Under appropriate circumstances, natural selection can favor a biological behavior for staying put or
moving to a new location based on the degree of similarity to adjacent conspecifics. In keeping with the
goal of the Schelling model, we are assuming the behaviors are not biologically grounded.
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When asked, they say that “[t]hey want children, all the children they can possi-
bly have. . . ,” which leads to decrease in birth spacing. At the same time, they want
healthy families and that acts as a constraint, for “they explained that they cannot
feed babies that are born too close together. . . . A mother had not enough milk to
sustain completely two infants at the same time.” This concern leads to increase in
birth spacing. These two interests are mediated through the absolute time/energy con-
straint faced by each woman: “to carry a third child and the food she gathers would
be practically impossible for those small women.” The women use intensive, on de-
mand nursing, which is also a highly effective method for birth control. They do not
conceptualize nursing as a means for birth control, though, but see the duration of
nursing as related to the health of a child: “they believe a child must have strong legs,
and it is mother’s milk that makes them strong . . . a child needs milk till he is three or
four years old at least” (all of the quotes are from Marshall 1976, pp. 166, 168). Their
perception does not have a biological basis, hence they are justifying the practice of
nursing a child for several years while leaving open when a woman will stop nursing
since “have strong legs” does not relate to any specific age for nursing to stop. In
brief, each woman is making “selfish” decisions based on her perception of what is
best for herself and her family. There is no indication that the women are making any
kind of group-oriented, altruistic decision.
From their comments, we form a simple, birth spacing decision model based on
a woman’s current time/energy cost for foraging and parenting, using the following
two simplifying assumptions:
(1) cost of parenting = (number of infants) × (cost of parenting per infant) and
(2) cost of foraging is proportional to the population size, where an infant is defined
as the time span from birth to cessation of nursing, the age range requiring the
greatest time/energy invested by a mother.
The decision rule is:
Decision Rule: Become pregnant if Total Cost = Cost of Parenting +
Cost of Foraging < Emax, where Emax is the maximum time/energy
that can be spent on foraging + parenting.
No attempt is made to calculate realistic values as the goal of the simulation is to
explore relative and not absolute effects. For fixed K , the simulation results can be
summed up as follows (see Read 1998, 2003 for details). First, K∗ varies directly with
the perceived cost of parenting. Cost of parenting beyond biological requirements
typically includes a cultural component, so K∗ varies directly with change in cultural
notions of what parenting involves. Second, K∗ varies inversely with maximum cost,
Emax, so to the degree Emax is culturally specified, K∗ is also culturally specified.
Thus, the magnitude of K −K∗, the degree to which a population is shielded against
stochastic variation in resource abundance, is determined by factors that have cultural
specification and is not simply a consequence of the mode of resource procurement.
We now apply the model to three patterns for the spatial relationships of group mem-
bers and social units to resources. The three spatial patterns characterize societies
with a band-level of organization (small scale hunter-gather societies), a patrilineal
mode of social organization and a matrilineal mode of social organization.
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Fig. 3 Predicted equilibrium population K∗ versus absolute carrying capacity K . Predicted curve has a
C shape
3.2 Spatial Pattern 1: definition and predictions
Definition The society is made up of residence units based on a small number (4–7)
of families. All members of the society have access to the resources in the region
occupied by the society, either directly or indirectly through kin relations. Population
growth increases the total number of persons accessing the same resources.
Spatial Pattern 1 is typical of hunter-gatherer societies. We will now make predic-
tions that relate to differences in the spatial density of food resources for hunter-
gatherer societies in different environmental conditions. We compare two hunter-
gatherer groups, one in a resource rich environment and the other in a resource poor
environment. The cost of foraging per day in a resource poor environment increases
at more than a proportional rate with the difference in resource density since for-
agers in resource poor environments have at least the extra cost per day of traveling
throughout the increased spatial area over which they must forage. Thus K∗ will de-
crease more rapidly than just in proportion to the change in K . Ultimately, though, as
resource density goes to zero, K∗ must approach K since in the limit of a region with
no resources, K = K∗. In regions with high resource density, reduction in fertility
through increased spacing of births may be insufficient to reach an equilibrium, K∗,
and instead the population size will continue to increase until it is limited by K ; that
is, by Malthusian parameters such as warfare, disease, starvation. These observations
predict that a graph of K∗ against K will have a C shaped curve in relationship to
the linear change of K with resource density as shown in Fig. 3. The C curve also
implies that conflict will be more likely in resource-rich environments where K∗ is
bounded by K .
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Fig. 4 Observed data for Australian hunter-gatherer groups. K∗ is proportional to 1/area, where area is
the total region used by a group, since population size has a modal size among hunter-gatherer groups and
so K∗ varies inversely with area. K is proportional to net above ground productivity. The curve is a best
fitting 2nd degree polynomial. Data are from Binford (2001)
Data on hunter-gatherer groups in Australia corroborate the predicted C shape
(see Fig. 4). The prediction about conditions leading to conflict is also supported:
“[W. Lloyd] Warner found multiple types of Murngin [an Australian hunter-gatherer
group] conflict . . . much of this lethal violence occurred in collective battles and raids
between rival groups . . . they inhabited a rich ecological environment” (Knauft 1996,
p. 85, emphasis added). Conflict like this has a long history in Arnhem Land, the
northern, resource rich area occupied by the Murngin (Taçon and Chippindale 1994),
including correlation between increase in resource availability and conflict: “. . . cli-
matic changes rendered Arnhem Land more ecologically plentiful 4,000 to 6,000
years ago. . . [rock] art style during this period exhibits a much greater incidence of
collective armed conflict. . .” (Knauft 1996, p. 86).
3.3 Spatial Pattern 2: definition and predictions
Definition The society is made up of communities (e.g., villages) made up of a mod-
erate number (10–15) of families. Each community is based on a single social unit
that has corporate control over a resource base for the community members. Social
units (hence communities) fission in response to internal conflicts due to population
growth. Fissioning leads to increase in the total spatial spread for the geographic loca-
tion of social units since the resource base of a social unit is not split when fissioning
takes place.
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Now consider some of the implications the model for birth spacing has for soci-
eties organized in accordance with spatial pattern 2. Social unit fissioning (which
limits the size of social units) in conjunction with corporate control of resources
“shields” females from population growth feedback affecting the time/energy women
spend on resource related tasks. This implies, according to the model, that birth spac-
ing will not increase with population growth for the society as a whole and the net
fecundity rate will always be positive. Consequently, K and not K∗ limits the total
population size. Fissioning leads to a proportionate increase in the total number of
social units and new units require new localities for resources, but the spatial spread
of social units is eventually limited by neighboring societies, hence population in-
crease will lead to within society, inter-unit conflict over resources. Segments of the
society can “hive off” as a consequence. A social unit, though, tends to be a stable,
socially cohesive unit. The total number of social units that can be maintained in a
single society is eventually limited by the relative autonomy of social units, lack of
centralized political structure, and society-level fissioning along conflict cleavages
that may arise between groups of social units. Patrilineal societies are a canonical
example of a society with this spatial pattern.
We make the following predictions.
Prediction 1 Societies will not be large and will have social units with population
size around 50–75 persons.
Prediction 2 Administrative organization will be limited and vertically shallow since
social units do not require a hierarchy for internal cohesion of a kin-based social unit
and is activated primarily at a local level for adjudicating conflicts between social
units.
We will verify these predictions in conjunction with the predictions for Spatial
Pattern 3.
3.4 Spatial Pattern 3: definition and predictions
Definition The society is made up of communities composed of several social units.
A social unit may be sub-divided and located in more than one community. Social
units are corporate units within the community. Social unit fissioning occurs within a
community and does not lead to fissioning of communities.
As with Spatial Pattern 2, a corporate unit controls access to resources and so
women are shielded from feedback from population growth. Thus birth spacing will
not increase with population increase and so the society population size is limited by
K and not K∗. Population growth and fissioning of a social unit within a commu-
nity leads to intra-community and not inter-community conflict. Community-level
administrative hierarchy develops as a way to deal with both intra-community con-
flict among social units within a community and with relations between communi-
ties when social units are distributed in more than one community. The population
size of the society increases with population growth of communities and there will
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Fig. 5 Predicted relationship between number of social units, size of social units and population size for
patrilineal and matrilineal societies
be relatively slow growth in the number of communities. Matrilineal societies are a
canonical example of Spatial Pattern 2.
We make the following predictions.
Prediction 3 Societies will vary from small to large and community sizes will vary
from small to large communities.
Prediction 4 Administrative hierarchical complexity will be deep since social units
require an administrative hierarchy for maintaining internal cohesion of social units
both within and between communities.
We also make the following predictions for the patrilineal, Spatial Pattern 2 and
matrilineal, Spatial Pattern 3 societies (see Fig. 5).
Prediction 5 A graph of society population size against number of social units will
have two components:
(a) a Spatial Pattern 2 component composed of patrilineal societies with a large,
positive slope, relatively small social units independent of the population size,
and no society with a large, total population size
and
(b) a Spatial Pattern 3 component composed of matrilineal societies with a small,
positive slope, size of social units increasing with the population size, and some
societies with large, total population sizes
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Prediction 6 Any exceptions to Predictions 1–5 should have historical explanation
for the exceptional status.
3.5 Verification of the predictions
The database for testing these predictions is a data set compiled by Henry Wright
(2006) for paramount states and is shown in Table 1. The paramount states split bi-
modally into two groups based on Total Complexity. Patrilineal and matrilineal forms
of social organization, with two exceptions, characterize these two groups. The two
exceptions are Kom and Benin.
Kom is a patrilineal society that became matrilineal: “Chilver and Kaberry (1967,
p. 31) also argued that the Kom were a patrilineal people . . . who only adopted ma-
trilineal institutions when they settled among peoples with matrilineal institutions.
Nkwi (1973, p. 85) was very categorical in stating that the fact that ‘rights and duties
derived from the father preponderate over those derived from the mother, . . . [this]
leads me to assert that Kom was formerly a patrilineal society.’ ” (Vubo 2005, p. 146).
Thus its exceptional status has historical explanation.
Benin, though patrilineal, developed a standing army in the 1300’s AD as a means
for what was otherwise a relative weak central administration to gain control over
trade and to reduce the autonomy of villages. Rather than an administrative struc-
ture developing from within, it was an administrative structure “imposed upon the
social and economic basis of the society” (Sargent 1986, p. 402) and thereby trans-
formed a patrilineal spatial structure of more-or-less autonomous local social units to
a matrilineal-like system of administrative control over local social units. Its excep-
tional status also has historical explanation. This verifies Prediction 6.
With the historical explanation for Kom and Benin in place, the bimodal distri-
bution for Total Complexity and patrilineal versus matrilineal (see right columns,
Table 1) verifies Predictions 2 and 4. A graph of Number of Units versus Population
size (see Fig. 6) verifies Prediction 5. The mean size of units for the patrilineal, Spa-
tial 2 societies and the low standard error for the mean (see Fig. 6) verify Prediction 1.
The mean size of units for the matrilineal, Spatial 3 societies and the large standard
error for the mean (see Fig. 6) verify Prediction 3.
4 Conclusions
The simulation shows that even a simple, culturally framed agent model for inter-
birth spacing in small scale, hunter-gatherer societies leads to insights not previously
recognized. Conventional models assume homogeneity across agents, leading to ei-
ther assuming population growth is always a prime mover or, contradictorily, that
equilibrium is the default condition for pre-state societies (see discussion in Read
and LeBlanc 2003). The simulation model developed here shows both assumptions
are inadequate, not for reasons relating to lack of empirical evidence, but due to fail-
ure to model behavior in accord with decision making that takes into account both
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Fig. 6 Graph of number of social units for population size. Data divide into two groups: patrilineal and
matrilineal societies. The groups, curves, and summary statistics match predictions. Data are from Wright
(2006)
Though initiated on a small-scale society, the model has unexpected predictions
for larger scale societies with different modes of social organization. It is applica-
ble to societies at a different scale because decision-making by women that affects
her reproductive potential is a constant feature across all societies and it is her real-
ized fecundity that is the primary factor in demographic patterns. Universally, women
are concerned with the health and well-being of their children and make decisions ac-
cordingly within a cultural framework of what is meant by health and well-being. But
such decisions are at the level of individual agents who need not be in synchrony with
regard to decisions made individually. One !Kung san woman may decide to become
pregnant while at the same time another woman may continue to nurse a child and
thereby defer a pregnancy, both acting according to the same decision model because,
in this case, the environment in which decision making is made has been modified
both internally by a woman’s past decisions and externally by decisions made by
other women. One woman may no longer have an infant and so has the time/energy
for a new child because food resources are still plentiful, given the current population
density, whereas the other woman is still nursing an infant.
In order to apply the same birth spacing model to other societies with other forms
of social organization we only need to take into account differences that might arise
over the feedback, if any, a woman receives as a result of changes in population size
(or density) in the society in which she is member. Unexpected, though, was the
unambiguous support for the model predictions. The pattern shown in Fig. 6 needs
no statistical analysis and underscores the fact that phenomena, seemingly complex
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on the surface, may have relative simple, underlying structuring processes. It is here
where the power of multi-agent simulations lies. Multi-agent simulations have the
ability to make sense of complex phenomena through realistic simulations formulated
in accord with the processes, both biological and cultural, that underlie the decisions
we make, while taking into account the consequences of agent interactions have on
the conditions under which those decisions are made. Multi-agent simulations devel-
oped in this manner will be ones in which the human aspect of human societies takes
center stage.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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